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Ill THE SUPREME COURT
i)F THE STATE OF UTAH
ROCKY MOUNTAIN' THRIFT STORES
INC., et al.i
Plaintiffs and
Appellants;
Supreme Court
No. 910471

-vsSALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
et a L ,
Defendants and
Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE, SALT LAKE COUNTY

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter on appeal under the
provisions of Section 78-2-2, Utah Code, 1953 as amended; and Rule
3 , Utah Rules of Appe 1 la I; e Pr ocedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was summary judgment properly granted by the trial court

upon the basis that defendants are immune from suit under the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Set;, 6'3--30" I 0 ( 1)?
2.

Was summary judgment properly granted by the trial court

upon the basis that defendants are immune from suit under the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Set ,ft.j-jo-i u (4 ) /
3.
i

Was summary judgment properly granted by the trial court
- a matter oi idw, plaintiffs failed to raise

any genuine issues i. fact requiring trial?

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court considers the
record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion, Citv Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah
1991), resolving all doubt in his favor, Briaham Truck & Implement
v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1987).

Because summary judgment

presents for review only questions of law, this Court reviews the
issues for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court.
Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp. . 836 P.2d 797 (Utah 1992). However,
an appellate court applies the same standard as that applied by the
trial court.

Citv Consumer Services, supra.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

Sections 63-30-10(1) and (4), Utah Code 1953 as amended (as in
effect in 1983) :
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived
for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or
omission of an employee committed within the scope of
employment except if the injury arises out of:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or
not the discretion is abused;

(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection;

Rule 56(c) and (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c) The motion (for summary judgment) shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall
2

be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

(e)
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be
made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of
all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court
may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made
and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.

Ru] e 4 5 01 (2)
(2)

111" a h C o d o o t J u d i c *: i >a I A d in i n i s t r a t i o n i

Motions for summary judgment.

(a)
Memorandum in Support of Motion.
The
points and authorities in support of a motion for summary
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a
concise statement of material facts as to which movant
contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall
specifically refer to those portions of the record upon
which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in Opposition to a Motion. The
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment shall begin with a section that contains
a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists
Each disputed
fact shall be stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of the record
upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable,
shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set
3

forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by
an accurate reference to the record shall be deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless
specifically controverted by the opposing party's
statement.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case is based upon the complaint of Plaintiffs, Rocky
Mountain Thrift Stores, et al. (RockyMtn), alleging negligence on
the part of Defendants, Salt Lake City Corporation, State of Utah,
Salt Lake County, et al. (Defts), in Defendants' efforts to control
flood waters coursing down City Creek during the spring runoff
floods of 1983.

In their complaint, filed September 15, 1983,

RockyMtn prayed for injunctive relief in their first cause of
action.

Said prayer soon became moot and no further proceedings

were had in regard thereto.

In their second cause of action,

RockyMtn claimed (1) an unconstitutional taking of their private
property

for public purposes, without

just compensation;

(2)

negligence by Defts in the design and maintenance of the City Creek
conduit underlying North Temple Street in Salt Lake City which was
the proximate cause of damage to RockyMtn; and (3) negligence by
Defts in several instances during efforts to control the 1983
spring runoff flood within City Creek which was the proximate cause
of damage to RockyMtn.
B.

Course of Proceedings.

Following a period of discovery, RockyMtn's complaint was
dismissed by Judge Philip R. Fishier on February 11, 1985, pursuant
to motions for dismissal and/or summary judgment filed by each of
4

the defendants. An appeal of that dismissal was subsequently taken
by RockyMtn to this Court.

That appeal was heard as Case No.

20513, and the Court's decision was delivered on December 14, 1989.
It is reported as Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores. Inc., et al. v.
Salt Lake Citv Corporation, et a h . 784 P. 2d 459 (Utah 1989) .
This Court upheld the trial court in ruling that RockyMtn had no
cause of action for the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation.

It further held that Defts were immune

from RockyMtn's allegations

of negligence

in the design and

construction of the culvert for City Creek which underlay North
Temple Street, because the decisions inherent in such design and
construction were discretionary functions. This Court remanded the
case to the District Court for development of additional evidence
concerning RockyMtn's allegations of negligence in the inspection
and maintenance of the culvert and in Defts' operations during
their attempts to control the City Creek flood.
Following remand, the parties engaged in further discovery.
Additional depositions were taken, i.e.. those of Dale Edward
Anderson, Merrill Norman, and Clark Lin.
certified their readiness for trial.
made motions for summary judgment.
memoranda

and supporting

RockyMtn thereupon

Thereafter, each defendant

Said motions were supported by

affidavits, as required

by Rule 4-

501(2)(a), Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In his "Summary Decision and Order"

filed September 4, 1991, Judge Michael R. Murphy granted Defts'
motions for summary judgment, and on October 1, 1991, Judge Murphy
5

entered summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City and Salt Lake
County. This present appeal is taken from Judge Murphy's grant of
summary judgment.
(The State of Utah and its individually named defendants were
granted summary judgment earlier upon separate grounds. The issues
related to that action of the District Court are addressed by those
defendants.)
C.

Statement of Uncontested Facts.

In order to avoid repetition in presentation of briefs, Salt
Lake County adopts the statement of facts presented by Salt Lake
City, with the following additions.

This is done with the

knowledge and consent of counsel for Salt Lake City.
1.

With respect to paragraph 3 of City's Statement, Section

17-8-5, Utah Code, 1953 as amended, was enacted

in 1947 to

authorize counties to provide for the carrying away and safe
disposal of natural storm and flood waters by utilization and
regulation of the natural channels within the counties.

(Judicial

notice of statute and annotations.)
2.

Additionally, with respect to paragraph 3 of City's

Statement, Salt Lake County adopted its ordinance for flood control
under the authority of said Sec. 17-8-5 in 1982, and published it
as Ordinance 7-2-1, et seq., Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
County.

Said ordinance is now codified as Section 17.08.010, et

seq. , Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances.

(Judicial notice of

provisions of ordinance and date of adoption.)
3.

Salt Lake City is a Utah municipal corporation with the
6

requisite police power to provide for the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens, and for the building and repairing of
culverts, drains, and facilities necessary to proper drainage.
(Sees. 10-8-38, 10-8-84, Utah Code, 1953 as amended.)
4.

With respect to paragraph 6 of City's statement, the

known historic peak flow of water through the City Creek conduit,
at its outfall at the Jordan River, was 272 cubic feet per second,
which occurred on September 26, 1982, at 11:00 a.m.

(R. 1149,

Mitckes affidavit, para. 5.)
5.

Conduit maintenance includes the principle of "self-

cleaning," which recognizes that water passing through the conduit
clears the conduit as it passes.

(R. 1149, Mitckes affidavit,

para. 16.)
6.

Following the thunderstorm of September, 1982, relatively

little storm water drainage entered the City Creek conduit to leave
behind sediment or debris because storms after that time would be
in the form of snow, which did not melt until the following May.
(R. 1149, Mitckes affidavit, para. 16.)
7.

Salt Lake County relied upon the fact that the extremely

high flows of water resulting from the thunderstorm in September,
1982 were carried successfully through the City Creek conduit to
establish the fact that the conduit was clean and unobstructed in
May, 1983. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 14, 43-44.)
8.

In addition to its reliance upon the capacity of the

conduit to carry the waters of the 1982 September thunderstorm as
proof that the conduit was clean and unobstructed, Salt Lake County
7

made further efforts to prepare the open channel portions of City
Creek to carry the spring runoff in 1983 by cleaning debris from
the creek bed upstream of Memory Grove and by dredging the Memory
Grove pond to act as a debris settlement basin.

(R. 581, Holzworth

deposition, pp. 43-44.)
9.

Stanley Butts, Salt Lake City foreman over drainage crews

during 1983, visually inspected the North Temple conduit prior to
the 1983 runoff by opening manholes between Memory Grove to 700
West

and

observed

water

obstruction in the conduit.

flowing

freely,

with

no

apparent

In addition to visual inspection, Mr.

Butts inserted a metal rod into the flow and determined that only
a few inches of silt and sand existed at the bottom of the conduit.
(R. 1167, Butts affidavit, paras. 3-4.)
10.

Thousands of tons, perhaps ten thousand tons of debris,

consisting of rocks, gravel, and earth material, were brought down
City Creek and into the conduit underlying North Temple during the
spring runoff flood of 1983.

Entire banks of City Creek were

washed into the flood waters for a distance more than five miles
upstream of Memory Grove. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 44-45;
R. 584, Haines deposition, p. 41.)
11.

More earth material was brought down by the flood waters

in City Creek than was later found in the conduit under North
Temple, plus the material picked up off of State Street as it was
deposited there during the time the water of City Creek was
diverted down State Street.
12.

(R. 581, Holzworth deposition, p. 45.)

The levels of silt and debris carried by City Creek were
8

so high that, after the waters of the Creek were diverted to State
Street and deposited into storm drains underlying Fourth South,
Eighth South, and Ninth South, the Fourth South drain became
plugged, and the Eighth and Ninth South drains were under threat of
also becoming plugged.
13.

(R. 584, Haines deposition, pp. 36-37.)

Stream flow in City Creek during the spring runoff floods

of 1983 exceeded by two times the previous historic high for
runoff.
14.

(R. 581, Holzworth deposition, p. 39.)
The City Creek flood was one which was in excess of that

which could statistically be expected to occur within City Creek
once in a hundred years.

(R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 39-

40.)
15.

Given the combination of record snow pack; a long, cold

and wet spring; and sudden temperature shift from cold to extremely
hot, the City Creek flood was one which was characterized by the
Flood Control Director for Salt Lake County as unpredictable,
unusual and unanticipated.

(R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 37-

38.)
16.

Because of the record snowpack, a heavier than normal

spring runoff was expected. However, the conditions which combined
to make the flood

one which was unpredictable,

unusual and

unanticipated did not all occur until mid-May, 1983.

(R. 581,

Holzworth deposition, pp. 5-6.)
17.

With respect to paragraph 11 of City's statement of

facts, officials of Salt Lake City assumed total responsibility and
control of the management of the City Creek flood waters.
9

Salt

Lake County was in nominal control only because of its Ordinance
(Sec. 7-2-1 et seq.), enacted under the authority of Sec. 17-8-5,
Utah Code, 1953 as amended, which included City Creek as one of the
County's natural channels over which County would exercise flood
control authority.

All decisions and actions relating to efforts

to control flood waters in May and June, 1983 from Memory Grove
through

the conduit

to the Jordan River were made

by City

officials. (R. 581, Holzworth deposition, pp. 18-19, 31-33, 41-42,
49; R. 584, Haines deposition, pp. 4-7.)
18.

Repairs to the conduit and North Temple, following the

excavation thereof to remove the material plugging the conduit,
could not be undertaken sooner than September, 1983, because of
continued high water flows through the conduit which prevented
engineering design.
19.

(R. 304-308, Langer affidavit, para. 6/Atch.)

Temporary steel decking or concrete planks were not

placed over the cut in North Temple where the road and conduit had
been excavated
engineering

for reasons of cost, safety,

necessity.

efficiency, and

(R. 304-308, Langer affidavit, para.

6/Atch.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case is before the Court for consideration of issues
related to the following:

(1)

Were Defts negligent in the

"operation and maintenance" of the conduit underlying North Temple
and during the management of the flood waters in City Creek during
the 1983 spring runoff flood?

(2) If, so, were Defts immune from
10

suit

for

such

negligence

under

the provisions

of

the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act?
Establishment of negligence requires more than the allegation,
even when the issue is before the courts on a motion for summary
judgment.

A plaintiff may not avoid the requirements of proof,

even at that early stage of litigation, simply by claiming an issue
of fact has been raised by the allegation.

In this case, RockyMtn

has utterly failed to do any more than cry, long and loud, that its
allegations raise issues of fact which must be tried, even in the
face of unrebutted, admissible evidence presented by Defts through
depositions

and

supporting

affidavits

which

clearly

refutes

RockyMtn's allegations.
RockyMtn has alleged negligence by Defts in the operation and
maintenance of the City Creek conduit. The only specific instance
of such negligence subsequently addressed by RockyMtn is the
alleged failure of Defts to inspect and clean the conduit in
preparation for the runoff.

As will be shown hereafter, such

allegation is totally without proof.
Even

if there were a scintilla

of evidence to support

RockyMtn's allegation in this specific instance, Defts are immune
from suit for claims arising therefrom under the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, specifically, Sec. 63-30-10(4)
(Section 63-30-10(1) (d) as the Act was written in 1983), which
immunizes governmental entities from suit for claims arising out of
"a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection."
11

Further, actions and decisions taken by Defts during the
"inspection and maintenance" of the City Creek conduit were the
exercise

or performance

of a discretionary

function

and any

negligence occurring therein are immune under the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-10(1)

(Sec. 63-30-

10(1)(a) as the Act was written in 1983.)
The only specific allegation of negligence occurring during
Defts' management of the flood waters is that Defts made improper
attempts to clear the City Creek conduit after it became plugged.
There is absolutely no evidence presented by RockyMtn to raise an
issue of negligence in this instance.

Further, the decisions and

actions taken by Defts to clear the conduit in the midst of the
attempt to control the flood waters of City Creek while those
waters were at peak flow were the exercise or performance of a
discretionary function and are thus immune from suit.
RockyMtn

makes

a

vague

and

non-specific

allegation

of

negligence in Defts' decisions/actions relative to traffic control
and repair of the conduit and North Temple after the road and
conduit were broken open to remove the material which plugged the
conduit. As will be shown hereafter, those actions were based upon
sound reasons of policy and engineering necessity, which cannot,
and have not, been rebutted.

Even if there were evidence to

support RockyMtn7s allegation in this regard, the decisions and
actions of Defts in the repair of the conduit and North Temple
involve the exercise or performance of a discretionary function and
are therefore, under the provisions of Sec. 63-30-10(1), Utah Code,
12

1953 as amended, immune from suit for claims arising therefrom.

OBJECTIONS TO APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
RockyMtn persists in claiming that certain "facts" have been
established which have no basis in the record. These "facts" have
been the subject of repeated objections by Defts, yet they continue
to appear in every argument made by RockyMtn in this case.
The most egregious of these "facts" are those claimed to have
been established by old reports of the United States Army Corps of
Engineers.

These "reports" are even referenced in this Court's

previous decision in this matter (Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores,
Inc. , et al. v. Salt Lake City Corporation, et al., supra).

At p.

460 of said case, the Court states:
Plaintiffs allege that defendants were well aware of
the runoff hazards from City Creek but failed to take
adequate precautions to prevent the damage caused by the
1983 spring runoff. . . Plaintiffs rely on several
affidavits and a series of reports from the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to substantiate their claims.
The record of this case clearly establishes that these socalled reports of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have never been
properly submitted as required by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 56 (c) identifies the sources which may be looked
to in deciding the propriety of summary judgment.

Those sources

are "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any."

Goetz

v. American Reliable Insurance Co., 844 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1992),
at 372.

The Corps of Engineers material to which RockyMtn has

continually referred, and the "facts" which RockyMtn maintains are
13

established by said materials, simply have no lawful foundation.
In requests for admissions, found at R. pp. 214-237, RockyMtn
requested the defendants to admit to certain statements contained
in certain Corps of Engineers documents. RockyMtn quoted extensive
sections of said documents and then requested the defendants to
admit to the averments of the same.

At each request, defendants

denied the truth of each and every statement.

The only admission

made was that the statements appeared to be an accurate copy of the
statements made in the Corps of Engineers documents.

See Answers

to Requests for Admissions, R., 418-443. The documents themselves
were never authenticated. Thereafter, copies of the documents were
attached by RockyMtn as exhibits to their "Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendants Salt Lake County and The State of Utah/s Motions for
Summary Judgment," filed November 27, 1984. RockyMtn also simply
asserted the contents of said reports in their memorandum in
opposition to Salt Lake City's motion for summary judgment.

(See

R. 294-302.) RockyMtn based their argument in said memoranda upon
those exhibits, just as if they were proper evidence; and have been
doing so ever since.

The averments of those documents border on

the bizarre, and are thoroughly discredited by persons such as
Terry Holzworth, the County's director of flood control during the
1983 spring runoff floods.

(See Holzworth deposition, R. 581, pp.

21-22, 50-52.)
In its 1989 decision in this case, the Court recognized that
the defendants are prepared to rebut these documents, but observed
that the trial court did not reach the negligence issues. At this
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point, however, this appeal is based directly upon RockyMtn's
allegations of negligence and its utter lack of evidence in support
thereof.

Consequently, it is time for the Court to finally

recognize that these documents, which RockyMtn has used to support
"facts" in its latest brief, are not proper evidence as required by
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Each and every "fact" asserted by RockyMtn based upon those
documents must be disregarded.

For the Courts information, those

"facts" as set forth in RockyMtn's brief, are as follows:
On p. 4 of their brief, RockyMtn states, "In May of 1983,
history repeated

itself."

As authority

for said

statement,

RockyMtn cites a May 16, 1991 affidavit of Clark Lin.

(RockyMtn

cites this affidavit to be at page 1468 of the record.

After an

extensive search, counsel for Salt Lake County found that affidavit
at page 1481.)*

Reference to that affidavit shows the following

statement:
10. City Creek Canyon has an extensive flooding history
and incidents were recorded ever since the days of early
settlement. In October of 1969, and again in December of
1978, the Department of the Army, Sacramento District,
Corps of Engineers evaluated the flood characteristics of
City Creek Canyon and determined that it is subject not
only to flooding, but debris flow (such as rock and mud
flows).
These reports were prepared for the Utah
Division of Water Resources and Salt Lake City and
County, and advised them that the debris flow would clog
the North Temple Storm Drain System leading to City
Creek, and cause extensive damage to downtown Salt Lake
*Note.
This is the point in the record at which said
affidavit was submitted to the court by RockyMtn's counsel. The
last page of the affidavit, plus purported signature of Clark Lin,
is an obvious facsimile; although RockyMtn7s counsel, Mr. Theodore,
has executed, with an original ink signature, his representation
that the affidavit was "subscribed and sworn to" before him.
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City if allowed to enter the storm drain system.
Mitigation measures were then recommended in the Corps of
Engineers report.
The affidavit thus repeats the unauthenticated hearsay of the
reports already discussed.
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states, "Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein."
"Rule 56(e) also requires that an affidavit in opposition to
a motion for summary judgment set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence." fA.P. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp.,
820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991).]
The

affidavit

requirements.

of

Mr.

Lin

wholly

fails

to

meet

these

RockyMtn cannot bootstrap its Corps of Engineers'

"reports" into the record through this affidavit.
On page 5 of its brief, RockyMtn repeats the "fact" that "as
early as 1979, the government possessed information, produced by
the Army Corps of Engineers, that the City Creek Canyon area was
vulnerable to massive sudden erosion and debris flow." This time,
RockyMtn cites to the reporter's transcript of the parties' oral
argument upon Defts' motions for summary judgment. Reference to a
transcript of oral argument to establish "fact" is ludicrous.
RockyMtn also cites to another affidavit of Mr. Lin, dated December
10, 1990.

(Again, the cite is to p. 1338 of the record.

another search, counsel found that affidavit at p. 1400.)
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After
That

affidavit contains a paragraph with the exact language as was
written in the May 16, 1991 affidavit (quoted above). Again, that
affidavit wholly fails to meet the requirements of Rule 56 (e).
On page 6 of its brief, RockyMtn resorts once again to the
"fact" that City Creek Canyon has an extensive history of flooding.
Again, the May 16, 1991 affidavit of Mr. Lin is cited as the source
of that "fact."
On pages 6-7 of its brief, RockyMtn makes the following as a
"statement of fact": "Despite the extensive history of flooding in
this area, and despite foreknowledge of the high snowpack, and
despite the fact that governmental authorities anticipated a
higher-than-average

spring

runoff,

the

government

failed

to

maintain the drainage system." Again, RockyMtn relies upon the May
16, 1991 affidavit of Mr. Lin as the source of these "facts."
RockyMtn's use of inadmissible documents as a basis for issues
of fact is not the only problem with their "Statement of Facts".
RockyMtn also cites to the deposition of County Flood Control
Director, Terry Holzworth, page 6, to support a "fact" that Defts
failed to maintain the City Creek drainage system.

On that page,

the following question was asked and answered:
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) "Then basically did you do
anything with respect to the pipeline itself along the
North Temple viaduct. Was it cleaned out?"
A.
(By Mr. Holzworth)
"We did not go to any
efforts to specifically clean that conduit.
We had
opportunity to be in that, I can't give you a specific
date, sometime between the fall of 1982 and the spring
runoff, to repair one of the manholes out there out near
the Fairgrounds, and we didn't have a report from our
field people that there was any obstruction or
accumulation in that storm drain, so we didn't have any
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reason to believe that it wouldn't flow freely."
Mr.

Holzworth

certainly

made

no

statement

to

justify

RockyMtn's assertion that, as a matter of "fact", defendants failed
to maintain the drainage system.
In making its "statement of fact" to say that the government
failed to maintain the drainage system, RockyMtn conveniently
ignores the following questions and answers of Mr. Holzworth, found
at p. 14 of his deposition (R. 581):
Q. (By Mr. Theodore) "Could you briefly describe
your inspection system to determine when and how often a
conduit should be cleaned?"
A. (By Mr. Holzworth) ". . . A s far as this
particular storm drain and any other conduit system Salt
Lake County has responsibility for, the routine program
so far has not evolved to the point where we have the
ability to go in and clean those on a scheduled basis, so
by and large the backing up of water or obstruction to
the flow of the system are triggers toward the need for
extensive work or cleaning work.
"We've had flows in the vicinity of 160 cubic feet
per second in the spring of 1982, also some summer storms
in the summer and fall of 1982 and didn't have any
problem demonstrating—no demonstrated problem with
capacity in the City Creek or any other pipe system, so
we were relying on that experience to tell us that
obstructions were not there."
On p. 44, the following questions and answers were given:
Q. (By Mr. Cutler) "At no time was there ever any
indication there was ever any impediment to the stream
flow coming down through the North Temple conduit; is
that right?"
A. (By Mr. Holzworth) "That's correct, we had no
indication of any obstruction."
Q.
"So you had formed an opinion then in your
overall assignment of County resources that the North
Temple drain was serviceable?"
A.

"That's correct."
18

Thus in arriving at their "statement of fact" that the
government failed to maintain the drainage system, RockyMtn lifted
information

from

Mr. Holzworth's

deposition

out

of context,

mischaracterized to this Court what Mr. Holzworth said, and ignored
further

testimony

which

established

that

Salt

Lake

County's

maintenance system for the North Temple conduit was to respond to
apparent blockages or impediments and remove them.
from summer

and fall thunderstorms

Because runoff

(including the tremendous

thunderstorm of September, 1982) had passed through the conduit
without problems, Mr. Holzworth made a determination that the
conduit was clean. This is the exact opposite of RockyMtn7s "fact"
that the government failed to maintain the conduit.
By citing to Clark Lin's affidavit to support their "statement
of fact" quoted above, RockyMtn again asks the Court to ignore the
requirements of Rule 56(e).

Nowhere does the affidavit establish

that Mr. Lin bases his statements upon personal knowledge, set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and show
affirmatively that Mr. Lin is competent to testify as to the
City's, County's, or State's program for inspection and maintenance
of the North Temple conduit.
RockyMtn continues in its "statement of facts" to make further
representations to the Court which have no support as required by
Rules 56 (c) and (e) .

On page 7 of its brief, RockyMtn again

asserts that "for several years prior to the flood, the government
failed to clean the system."

That assertion's cite to Mr.

Holzworth's deposition, page 6, is totally erroneous, and the
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assertion has no support in the record.
RockyMtn

asserts that

the

failure

to maintain

"allowed

sediment to build-up in the North Temple culvert." This assertion
cites to the record, pp. 1303-1308. Those pages, however, contain
portions of two separate documents —

"Plaintiffs Answers to Salt

Lake City's First Set of Interrogatories," (Exhibit 'U' to Salt
Lake City's Memorandum

in Support of its Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed May 9, 1991) and "Supplemental Answers to Salt Lake
City's

Interrogatories

Memorandum).

to Plaintiffs,"

(Exhibit

'V

to

said

Thus, whatever RockyMtn meant by its reference to

those pages of the record is unknown. The assertion also cites Mr.
Lin's deposition as the basis for the "fact."

A review of that

deposition, particularly that part cited, shows that Mr. Lin
testifies as to matters which would not be admissible in court.
Nowhere does he claim any personal knowledge, nor competence to
give evidence concerning sediment build-up in the North Temple
conduit.

To make an assertion of "fact", Mr. Lin must have

personal knowledge
sediment.

in order to testify as to a build-up of

The assertion is not an expert opinion, which Mr. Lin,

if he could qualify as an expert, could give based upon hearsay.
Mr. Lin cannot, therefore, be used by RockyMtn to establish a
"fact."
The next assertion made by RockyMtn as "fact" states, "the
sediment was a major factor in blocking flood water and in the
subsequent flooding."

Its cite to the record is to pp. 1050-1051,

which is a portion of Mr. Lin's deposition, attached to Salt Lake
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City's aforementioned memorandum in support of its motion for
summary judgment as Exhibit 'C.' Those pages contain no mention of
a sediment build-up whatsoever. Again, whatever RockyMtn meant by
reference to those pages is unknown.

And, again, RockyMtn cites

Mr. Lin's May 16, 1991, affidavit as support for this "fact."
Although this discussion has been long and detailed, it is
made to show what has been wrong with this case from the beginning.
RockyMtn has continually made bald allegations and, when challenged
for proof, refers the challenger to more allegations, or to
hearsay. This detailed analysis of RockyMtn's "Statement of Facts"
is presented to show the Court that RockyMtn has not complied with
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nor with Rule 24 (a) (7) and
(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SALT LAKE COUNTY (AND CITY) WAS NOT NEGLIGENT REGARDING
INSPECTION/MAINTENANCE OF THE NORTH TEMPLE CONDUIT
RockyMtn alleges that Defts were negligent in the inspection/
maintenance of the North Temple conduit.

Beyond that allegation

there is nothing. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence
to support the allegation.

The best RockyMtn can do is point to

the deposition and affidavits of Clark Lin.

Examination of those

materials shows that Mr. Lin is asserting a lack of maintenance/
inspection upon two bases:

(1)

That the materials found in the

conduit during the clean-out process were "dry", "cementitious",
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and "hard-packed clay"; and (2) the fact that the conduit plugged
in the first place.
As to (1) , Mr. Lin's deposition makes clear that he has no
personal knowledge of the condition of the materials found in the
conduit when it was cleaned out.

He was not there.

He did not

review a soils report. There was no analysis of the materials. He
bases his description, and opinion, upon the deposition of Frank
Helm.
Mr. Helm testified in his deposition as follows regarding the
material found in the conduit:
"Q.
(By Mr. Theodore) The type of debris, the
largest size you indicated was around a two-foot diameter
boulder?
"A. (By Mr. Helm) We took boulders, cobbles, the
creek run cobbles out approximately two-foot in diameter
and down. It was varying. It was almost a cementitious
material. It was very dense and hard packed in this
area.
"Q. Could you tell how long that material had been
in the pipe to become in a cementitious compaction?
"A. No, I couldn't because I'm not a geologist. I
wouldn't — it could have been in two weeks or it could
have been in two years or it could have come down with
the flood from City Creek.
ff

Q. So you couldn't make an opinion one way or the

other?
,f

A.

No, sir, I wouldn't.

"Q. Okay. The nature of the compaction, was it a
cement-like consistency at the time that you were going
through or is it—
"A.
No, When I say cementitious, it was very
densely packed.
"Q. But it wasn't anything that would be considered
a cement type of aggregate that had plugged the entire
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pipe? You are talking about densely compacted material?
"A.

Right.

"Q. And could you tell whether there was a gradient
on the material, whether the large objects had settled to
the bottom or were they all add mixed in a uniform type
of mixture or do you recall?
,f

A. I would say that where we started boring, it
was pretty uniformly mixed because there was fines in
it." (R. 583, Helm deposition, pp. 24-25.)
Mr. Helm does not describe the material found in the conduit
any further.

In particular, he makes no statement concerning the

relative wetness or dryness of the material. Nor does he make any
reference to the material as "clay."
We now turn to the testimony of Mr. Lin, the witness upon whom
RockyMtn relies to make its claim of negligence.

His deposition

states as follows:
"Q. (By Mr. Baird) You told me that the pipes were
plugged before the flood, correct?
M

A.

"Q.

(By Mr. Lin)

Correct.

What do you base that on, sir?

"A. Well, from the depositions, you know, I read
that shows what the — I mean the pipes — you know, the
mud — not the mud — the materials in the pipe are dry
clays.
"Q.

Whose deposition did you read that in, sir?

"A.

I don't recall the name. I have to go through

them.
"Q. Take your time. Point me to every page, sir,
in those depositions where anyone tells you that the
pipes were plugged up with hard clay.
"A.

Could I talk to my lawyer?

"Mr. Baird:

Yes, I'll let you.
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(Discussion held off the record between the witness
and Mr. Theodore.)
"The Witness:
the pipes.

I remember where they had to auger

"Q. (By Mr. Baird) Does augering the pipes, sir,
necessarily mean that the material in it was hard-packed
clay?
"A.

Yes.

I mean, it's hard.

"Q. You never auger anything other than hard-packed
clay; is that correct?
"A.

Not necessarily.

(Time lapse.)
"Q. While you're looking, let me look through this
other one.
"A. Go ahead. I think this is the only one I'll be
looking at.
(Time lapse.)
The Witness:

Okay.

"Q.

You found it?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

Tell me what page and line it is, sir.

"A. It's in the conversation on pages 24, 25, 26
through about 27.
"Q.

That's the deposition of who?

"A.

Frank Helm.

"Q. . . . Is there any other source, sir, for you
to understand that this material was dry or hardened
clay?
"A. No."
"Q (By Mr. Baird) I'm reading from a portion of
Mr. Helm's testimony. Tell me if this is what you're
relying on.
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'Question: Could you tell how long that
material had been in the pipe to become in a
cementitious compaction?
'Answer: No, I couldn't because I'm not
a geologist. I wouldn't — It could have been in two
weeks, or it could have been in two years, or it could
have come down with the flood from City Creek.
'Question:
So you
opinion one way or another?
'Answer:
Correct?
"A.

couldn't

make an

No sir, I wouldn't.'

You just read that; correct?
Right.

"Q. If Mr. Helm who was there says that he can't
tell whether it came down two weeks before, two years
before or with the flood, how can you, sir, sitting here
tell me that you know that that material didn't come down
either two weeks before or with the flood?
"A. Okay. I —
form my own opinion."
16.)*

I read both. All right. And I
(R. 1047, Lin deposition, pp. 13-

It is conceded that one testifying as an expert does not
necessarily have to have first-hand knowledge of the material upon
which the expert opinion is based.
Evidence.)

(Rule 705, Utah Rules of

However, just because one is called as an expert

witness does not mean that everything to which he testifies is an
expert opinion.

An expert witness may not relate hearsay when it

is not part of an expert opinion.

In this case, Mr. Lin is

*Note: Although the deposition is contained in the record at
this point as an exhibit to Salt Lake City's memorandum in support
of its motion for summary judgment, the deposition was published on
motion of counsel for Salt Lake County. See the transcript of the
hearing upon said motion, R. Vol. V, p. 31.)
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describing the materials found in the conduit.

That does not

require an expert opinion.

What it does require is personal

knowledge of the materials.

That is something Mr. Lin does not

have, and his description of the materials as dry, cementitious,
hard-packed, clay is inadmissible hearsay.

Worse than that, it

doesn't even accurately repeat the description given by Mr. Helm,
who did have first-hand knowledge of the material in the conduit.
Since Mr. Lin's "expert opinion" that the conduit was plugged
before the runoff started is based upon a non-existent set of
"facts", it is no opinion at all, and cannot be used by RockyMtn to
prove its allegation of negligence in the inspection/maintenance of
the conduit.

Without that "expert opinion", RockyMtn has no

evidence whatsoever that lack of inspection/maintenance caused the
conduit to plug. Thus summary judgment on that issue was properly
granted.
As to (2), above, Mr. Lin has claimed that the mere fact the
conduit

became plugged

proves that there was no inspection/

maintenance of the drainage system.

This is nothing more than a

resort to res ipsa loquitur in a situation where it is not
permitted.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur requires a plaintiff to
prove three elements:

(1)

The accident was of a kind which, in

the ordinary course of events, would not have happened in the
absence of negligence; (2) the agency or instrumentality causing
the accident was at the time of the accident under the exclusive
management or control of the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff's own
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use or operation of the agency or instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the accident.

[King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals,

Inc.. 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992).]
Ultimately. . . to establish a res ipsa loquitur case,
the plaintiff must lay a foundation from which it can be
established that negligence was probably the cause of the
injury. The law is clear that an undesired complication
or result. . . does not by itself imply that the result
was caused by someone's breach of a duty of due care.
[Id., at 862.]
In the instant case the factors which combined in May, 1983 to
produce the historic floods occurring throughout the State of Utah
were obviously

not within the management

or control

of the

defendants. The tremendous amount of earth materials brought down
during the flood, which ultimately caused the blockage, were a
direct result of the combination of factors of record snowpack;
late, wet and cold spring; sudden temperature shift from cold to
very hot.
control.

None of those factors was within the defendants'
Control of the debris within the flood was also not

within the exclusive control of the defendants.

To even attempt

such control, defendants would have had to design and construct a
debris-collection and drainage system far more extensive than was
feasible, given the extremely rare occurrence of such floods vis-avis the high cost to the citizens of Salt Lake County to install
such a system.

Since this Court has previously ruled in Rocky

Mountain Thrift Stores, supra. that defendants cannot be sued for
the exercise of its discretionary powers concerning the extent of
the drainage system it must install to protect citizens of Salt
Lake County, it cannot now be argued that the defendants have
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exclusive control over the debris-laden flood waters which are the
source of RockyMtn's complaint.

Further, defendants would never

know when it has installed a sufficient drainage system to stop all
flooding.

That fact alone establishes the no one can have

exclusive management and control over the causes of flood.
Therefore, since res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this
case,

Mr.

Lin's

assertion

that

negligence

in

inspection/

maintenance of the conduit is established by the mere fact that the
conduit became plugged cannot be used by RockyMtn to avoid summary
judgment.
POINT II
ALL DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FROM CLAIMS
ARISING OUT OF A FAILURE TO MAKE AN INSPECTION
OR BY MAKING A NEGLIGENT OR INADEQUATE INSPECTION
The point raised herein was relied upon by the trial court as
a basis for grant of summary judgment to defendants. That court's
analysis is adopted for purposes of this argument.

The court

stated,
Lin used the terms "maintenance" and "inspection"
interchangeably, but it is clear that a regular "program"
of inspection would be either the precursor to or a part
of maintenance. As such, it is subject to either the
applicable statutory provision immunizing government
conduct relating to inspections or failures to inspect or
is the result of a policy decision not to have a regular
program for inspection and maintenance and thus entitled
to discretionary immunity. (R. 1579, Summary Decision
and Order.)
In Ledfors v. Emery County School District. 849 P.2d 1162
(Utah

1993),

this

Court

construed

the meaning

of

the

Utah

Governmental Immunity Act's language which retains immunity for
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governmental
situations.

entities

from

claims

"arising"

out

of

certain

In that case, which involved claims for damages to a

child injured by a beating received at the hands of other students,
plaintiffs brought suit against the school district alleging a
failure to supervise. The school district defended upon the basis
that Sec. 63-30-10

(2) , Utah Code, 1953 as amended, retained

immunity for claims arising out of assaults.

This Court stated,

(W)e likewise find no merit in the Ledforses' argument
that the injuries alleged here arose from the failure to
supervise rather than from a battery. Again, our prior
cases have looked to whether the injury asserted "arose
out of" conduct or a situation specifically described in
one of the subparts of 63-30-10; if it did, then immunity
is preserved.
We have rejected claims that have
reflected attempts to evade these statutory categories by
recharacterizing the supposed cause of the injury. [Id.,
at 1166.]
In the instant case, RockyMtn attempts to categorize its claim
as a "failure to maintain" the conduit (although RockyMtn also
often characterizes the alleged fault of defendants as a "failure
to inspect").

However, as stated by Judge Murphy, "(I)t is clear

that a regular

'program' of

inspection would

precursor to or a part of maintenance."
Order, supra.)

be either the

(Summary Decision and

Thus, whether characterized as "maintenance" or

"inspection", defendants actions in regard to monitoring the North
Temple conduit are immune under the provisions of Sec. 63-30-10(4).
POINT III
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
THE EXERCISE OR PERFORMANCE OF A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
A program of inspection and maintenance for storm drainage
conduits necessarily involves the exercise of a discretionary
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function.

This Court has stated four factors to consider in

determining whether actions of a governmental entity qualify as
"discretionary functions."

[Little v. Utah State Div. of Fam.

Serv., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), reiterated in Rocky Mountain Thrift
Stores, supra.1
1.

"Does

necessarily

Those factors are discussed as follows:
the

involve

challenged
a basic

act,

omission

governmental

policy,

or

decision

program

or

objective?"
Salt Lake County's program for the carrying away and safe
disposal of natural storm and flood waters is based upon specific
authorization of the legislature, found in Sec. 17-8-5, Utah Code.
This Court has already found that activities relating to flood
control management in City Creek Canyon are governmental functions.
fRocky Mountain Thrift Stores, supra, at 462.]

There is no

qualitative difference between utilization of the North Temple
conduit for carrying away storm and flood waters of City Creek and
the utilization of conduits for carrying away storm and flood
waters in any other natural watercourse, such as Emigration Creek,
Mill Creek, etc., or, for the carrying away storm and flood waters
from subdivision streets.

It is therefore contended that the

installation and maintenance of a storm drainage system involves a
basic government policy, program or objective.

The criteria of

this first of four factors are clearly met in this case.
2.

"Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential

to the realization or accomplishment of that policy, program or
objective as opposed to one which would not change the course or
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direction of the policy, program, or objective?"
The questioned act here is whether to inspect/maintain the
conduits which carry storm and flood waters.

Once a drainage

system, which includes conduits, is constructed, the level of
maintenance to be provided thereafter is an essential consideration
in the overall effectiveness of the system.

Depending upon the

decisions made by the governmental entity's governing body as to
the inspection/maintenance to be provided, a storm drainage system
can remain at design capacity, or diminish to the point as if the
system had not been constructed

in the first place.

It is

therefore submitted that installation and maintenance of a storm
drainage system meets the second of these four factors.
3.

"Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise

of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of
the governmental agency involved?"
The level of inspection/maintenance to be provided all or part
of a storm drainage system calls into issue all of the policy
evaluation, judgment, and expertise that is required to decide
whether to install the system in the first place, as well as the
design characteristics to be included during the installation.
Each time inspection and maintenance of a drainage system is
considered, policy makers must weigh the competing needs of other
government programs for funds.

An appropriation in one program

will necessarily lessen the funds available for another program.
The tax burden to be levied upon the citizens is involved in every
budget process.

Flood control officials must make reasoned
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decisions whether a particular channel must be cleaned to meet
anticipated

needs.

Differing

weather

patterns

affect

those

decisions. An official may reason, for example, that because there
was very little snowpack during a winter season that runoff will be
so slight as to not require rigorous cleaning of water channels to
prepare for it; consequently, his available funds would be better
utilized that year for construction of an expanded drainage system.
On the other hand, the need for clearing water channels may appear
so great in order to prepare for an immense snow pack runoff that
the flood control official will have to decide which area is most
at risk for flooding and devote his resources accordingly. A good
example of the expertise and judgment required in this area is
provided in this case.

Terry Holzworth, Salt Lake County flood

control director, testified that he had determined that conduits in
the County would be cleaned when obstructions appeared, rather than
conduct regularly scheduled inspection/maintenance which may or may
not be needed.

He made the decision with the knowledge that his

resources would be stretched very thin while his department worked
to prepare the watercourses in the County for the 1983 spring
runoff.

He used his expertise and judgment to decide that the

North Temple conduit was clean and unobstructed because it had
successfully carried the extremely high urban runoff from the
previous September's cloudburst without serious problems. Instead,
he concentrated the efforts and funds of the flood control division
to cleaning and preparing the open channel portion of City Creek,
upstream of Memory Grove, as well as to the channels of other
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watercourses throughout the County.

It is therefore submitted,

that inspection/maintenance of drainage systems meets this third of
four factors.
4.

"Does the governmental

agency

involved

possess the

requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty
to do or make the challenged act, omission, or decision?"
The previous discussion establishes that this factor is
clearly met.

Also, Section 17-8-5, Utah Code, 1953 as amended,

clearly places authority in Salt Lake County to plan for and
construct drainage systems for storm and flood runoff.
Therefore, Judge Murphy correctly ruled that a determination
whether to conduct a regular program of inspection and maintenance,
or not, is the result of a policy decision and is thus entitled to
discretionary immunity.
POINT IV
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE REPAIR AND
RESTORATION OF NORTH TEMPLE AND IN THE MAINTENANCE OF AN
OPEN EXCAVATION UNTIL REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED
In a vague and off-handed way, RockyMtn claims they were
damaged because Defts were negligent in the manner in which they
conducted the repair and restoration of North Temple after the
street and conduit were opened to clean out the materials which
blocked the conduit.

RockyMtn's allegation in this regard is set

forth in the First Cause of Action of their Complaint.

As

explained above, that cause of action was not pursued by RockyMtn
and soon became moot.

However, in the Second Cause of Action,
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RockyMtn may be deemed to have repeated their allegation in para.
26 of the complaint, which states, "Plaintiffs replead and reallege
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 25 of the First
Cause of Action."
Beyond that allegation, RockyMtn has presented absolutely no
evidence

through

depositions,

interrogatories,

admissions, or

affidavits to provide any proof of the allegation.

However, in

response to the allegation, Salt Lake County submitted an affidavit
in support of its motion for summary judgment.

That affidavit was

prepared by Wilfried Langer, vice-president of J.M. Montgomery
Consulting Engineers, Inc. It is a direct refutation of RockyMtn's
allegation of negligence in the defendants7 maintenance of an open
excavation after the conduit and street were opened to clean the
conduit, the refusal to place steel decking or concrete planks over
the excavation, and in the start of repairs.
pp. 304-308 of the record on appeal.

The affidavit is at

The facts stated in said

affidavit are absolutely undisputed by RockyMtn in any way, shape,
or form.
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states as follows:
. . . When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may
not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
It is well established that upon submission of Mr. Langer's
affidavit, RockyMtn is required to submit responsive affidavits or
other evidentiary materials allowed by Rule 56(e).
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Upon its

failure to do so, the trial court could properly conclude that
there are no genuine issues of fact and, on the basis of applicable
law, enter summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

fCowen and

Company v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984).]
Consequently, defendants are entitled to summary judgment in regard
to this allegation of negligence made by RockyMtn.
POINT V
SALT LAKE COUNTY OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFFS TO CONTROL
THE 1983 SPRING RUNOFF FLOOD, NOR TO INSTALL, INSPECT,
OR MAINTAIN A DRAINAGE SYSTEM FOR CITY CREEK
Salt Lake County has no statutory duty to provide for any
flood control of City Creek, nor of any other channel within the
County.
Salt Lake County's role in the control of flood and storm
waters for the benefit of the citizens residing in the County is
based upon the authority provided by Sec. 17-8-5, Utah Code, 1953
as amended.

That statute states:

In anticipation of and to provide for the carrying away
and the safe disposal of natural storm and flood waters,
the board of county commissioners may remove any obstacle
from any natural channel within the county and the
incorporated municipalities in the county. For the same
purpose, the board may plan for and construct new
channels, storm sewers and drains to serve as though they
were natural channels . . . The board of commissioners
may also provide for the maintenance, improvement and
fencing of all such channels, including covering or
replacement with buried conduits. . . .
By this statute, the legislature authorized counties to engage
in flood and storm water control through use and regulation of
natural channels, as well as to establish new channels to serve as
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though they were natural channels. The amount, quality, level, and
type of flood control effort is left to the discretion of the board
of commissioners.

The statute imposes no mandate or duty for any

flood control, but only an authority to act which the board "may"
exercise. In Board of Education of Granite School District v. Salt
Lake County. 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983), at 1035, this Court stated,
"This Court assumes that the terms of a statute are used advisedly
and should be given an interpretation and application which is in
accord with their usually accepted meanings."

A provision of a

statute couched in permissive terms is generally regarded as
discretionary unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

In

Grant v. Utah State Land Board. 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971), this
Court found the word "may," in a statute pertaining to the land
board, not to import certainty, but uncertainty; and thus, the
reasonable deduction to be made was that the ordinary meaning of
the term "may" was that one "may" or "may not" act.

"If the

legislature had intended an absolute right . . . instead of saying
that an applicant 'may have his contract reinstated, ' it could
easily have used the word 'shall' or 'must,' and thus have rendered
a mandatory meaning clear."

(Id.. at 1036-1037.)

Similarly, the term "may" in Sec. 17-8-5 vests the board of
county commissioners with discretion as to the amount or extent of
flood and storm water management it will provide.

The County had

no "duty" to provide RockyMtn any particular kind, type, or degree
of protection from natural storm and runoff waters.
Salt Lake County's authority in this area is similar to the
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authority granted Salt Lake City under the provisions of Sec. 10-838, Utah Code, 1953 as amended, wherein it states:
Boards of commissioners, city councils and boards of
trustees of cities and towns may construct, reconstruct,
maintain and operate, sewer systems, sewage treatment
plants, culverts, drains, sewers, catch basins, manholes,
cesspools and all systems, equipment and facilities
necessary to the proper drainage . . . requirements of
the city or town and regulate the construction and use
thereof•
POINT VI
SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD NO ROLE IN MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS
OF CITY CREEK DURING THE ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL SAID WATERS
AND NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR CITY'S ACTIONS
It is an undisputed fact that officials of Salt Lake City made
all decisions, and took all actions, involved with the management
of the flood waters of City Creek during the period in which the
North Temple conduit became plugged, and in the attempts to remove
that obstruction.

Salt Lake City stands on a equal footing with

Salt Lake County as regards municipal authority within the State of
Utah, and has never been considered to be the agent of Salt Lake
County in the provision of municipal services or exercise of police
power.

As this Court made crystal clear in Mountain States

Telephone and Telegraph v. Salt Lake County. 702 P.2d 113 (Utah
1985) (utility franchise fees case) , and Salt Lake City Corporation
v. Salt Lake County. 550 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1976) ("double taxation"
case) , cities and counties are not alter egos of each other, and
are not agents of the other. Each one has its separately ordained
powers and responsibilities. Therefore, RockyMtn's allegations of
negligence which involve those actions and decisions taken by
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officials of Salt Lake City during their attempts to manage the
flood waters of City Creek and the removal of the obstruction in
the North Temple conduit do not raise allegations of negligence
against Salt Lake County.
POINT VII
CLARK LIN CANNOT PROVIDE COMPETENT TESTIMONY
TO ESTABLISH NEGLIGENCE ON PART OF DEFENDANTS
In every instance where Defts present evidence, in the form
required by Rule 56(e), RockyMtn attempts to avoid judgment by
claiming that Clark Lin, as an expert, has raised a "question of
fact" which requires the case to go to trial. However, as alluded
to above, Mr. Lin has not saved the case for RockyMtn because he
has not, and cannot, provide evidence as required by Rule 56(e).
In Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992), this Court
held,
(T)he drafters (of Rule 705, Utah Rules of Evidence) did
not intend to exempt expert affidavits in opposition to
summary judgment from rule 56(e)'s requirement that
affidavits set forth specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial. We therefore follow the path
laid down in Williams
[ Will jams v. Melby, 699 P. 2d 723
(Utah 1985) ] to the explicit holding that affidavits must
include not only the expert's opinion, but also the
specific facts that logically support the expert's
conclusions. . . In so doing, we stress the requirement
that rule 56(e) requires specific
facts. . . (A) bare
assertion that the expert has reviewed the facts and
based his or her opinion on them will not suffice. (Id. ,
at 104.)
Long sections of Mr. Lin's deposition have already been quoted
herein to show that he cannot point to specific facts which support
his opinion of negligence.

RockyMtn apparently recognized that

failing, and made one last attempt, through submission of Mr. Lin's
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affidavit dated May 16, 1991, to raise a genuine issue of fact.
Most of that affidavit has been discussed above, particularly as it
references the non-existent reports of the Army Corps of Engineers.
The remainder of that affidavit is now examined.
Mr. Lin states that
(I)t is practical to handle debris flows or sediment
laden flows with a system of debris basins and open
channels as practiced in jurisdictions such as Los
Angeles and Las Vegas. If an enclosed pipe system must
be used, such as the subject of these proceedings, it is
standard procedure in the industry to install debris
basins to prevent the debris or large amounts of sediment
from entering the pipe system and to employ a program of
maintenance and inspection to insure that the pipes are
kept clean to prevent blockage of the flow passages. (R.
1482, Lin affidavit, para. 11.)
Not only does Mr. Lin's statement fail to relate any specific
facts to support his opinion, his opinion at this point addresses
an area which has already been ruled by this Court to be immune
from suit.

The design and capacity of the City Creek drainage

system has been ruled to be a discretionary function.
Mr. Lin goes on to say, "These enclosed pipe systems quickly
lose their ability to convey water and debris if they are not
cleaned as often as necessary, usually at least once a year before
the spring runoff" (emphasis added). (R. 1482-1483, Lin affidavit,
para. 11.)

Mr. Lin recognizes that the basic requirement for

cleaning is "as necessary."
Flood

Control

Director,

That is the same standard applied by
Terry

Holzworth,

who

relied

a conduit

upon

impediments

or blockages to tell him that

needed

cleaning.

Moreover, as the Defts' affidavits, answers, and

depositions in this case clearly show, there was no blockage in the
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conduit prior to the runoff. The conduit was clean, made so by the
prior September's massive cloudburst, which was carried through the
North Temple conduit without problems. (See Mitckes' affidavit, R.
1149.)
Mr. Lin goes on to say, "In his opinion, it was not good,
accepted engineering practice for Salt Lake County in 1983 not to
have a program to regularly inspect and clean the North Temple
conduits (sic) leading to City Creek at least once each year before
the spring runoff."

(R. 1483, Lin affidavit, para. 12.)

Again,

Mr. Lin has no specific facts upon which to base his opinion. The
facts are that Salt Lake County did have a program to inspect and
clean conduits.

It's

"trigger" for cleaning,

Mr.Holzworth, is an indication of reduced flow.

as

stated by

Mr. Lin has

already admitted that the important requirement is to clean as
often as is necessary.

His once per year standard has no logical

support.
Mr. Lin then states,
Given the extensive five block long clog of the 7 foot
diameter North Temple segment of the City Creek drainage
system, in his opinion the conduits already contained
extensive sediment deposits accumulated from the past
before the 1983 Spring run-off, and consequently plugged
as predicted by the Department of the Army Sacramento
District, Corps of Engineers. (R. 1483, Lin affidavit,
para. 13.)
The

Corps

discussed.
opinion.

of

Engineers

"predictions" have

already

been

They are inadmissible and cannot support Mr. Lin's
Besides, all Mr. Lin has done here is repeat his

"opinion" that the conduit was filled with sediment, even though
such a statement is one of fact and requires personal knowledge.
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As has been repeatedly stressed, Mr. Lin has no facts upon which to
give an opinion that the conduit would have been any more clean and
ready for the 1983 runoff than if Salt Lake County had sent an army
of workers through the conduit with brooms and dust pans on May 15,
1983.
In his next paragraph, Mr. Lin further opines concerning the
negligence arising from certain facts, i.e., diversion of all of
the City Creek above ground through a man made channel before the
conduit was plugged.

(R. 1483, Lin affidavit, para. 14.) That may

be all right if only the "facts" stated as the premise of Mr. Lin's
opinion were facts. However, The City has thoroughly refuted those
"facts" and Mr. Lin has no other basis for the opinion.

(It is

interesting, however, to note that in this paragraph of his
affidavit, Mr. Lin recognizes that the City Creek conduit has a
11

self-cleaning" capacity.

This is exactly what Mr. Holzworth and

Salt Lake County relied upon as part of its conduit maintenance
program.)
Next, Mr. Lin tries to refute (R. 1483, Lin affidavit, para.
15) Defts' May 9, 1991 affidavit of Stephen Mitckes (R. 1149),
which established the flows in the City Creek conduit in September,
1982, and between May 24, 1983 and June 3, 1983.
affidavit

Mitckes'

showed that the conduit carried up to 272 cfs in

September, 1982; and carried up to 206 cfs between May 24, 1983 and
June 8, 1983, when the conduit plugged.

The effect of these

measurements is clearly that the conduit could not have been filled
with sediment before the 1983 spring runoff because it carried up
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to the conduit's capacity for several days before it finally
plugged.

All Mr. Lin does in his affidavit to refute the meaning

and effect of these facts is to say, "Mitckes has not provided
sufficient

data

measurements."

to

establish

the

reliability

of

his

flow

Where are Mr. Lin's facts, as required by Rule

56(e)?
POINT VIII
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE 4-501, CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
The trial court has identified the failure of RockyMtn to meet
the requirements of Rule 4-501(2)(b) in response to Defts' motions
for summary judgment. The rule must be enforced in order for it to
have any meaning.

Parties should not be allowed to ignore the

rulef make no attempt to marshal its facts for the trial court, and
then obtain relief from the appellate courts.

The rule is

extremely easy to understand, and puts no unfair burden on the
parties to a lawsuit.
complete
followed.

As this case perfectly exemplifies, nearly

disorganization

will

result

when

the

rules

aren't

Salt Lake County joins with other defendants in urging

this Court to set a standard which requires parties to comply with
Rule 4-501(2) or else the offending party may not claim to have
facts before the courts which will avoid summary judgment.

This

court will never have a better case than this one with which to set
this reasonable rule.

Since enforcement of the plain language of

Rule 4-501(2) in such a manner in this case creates no new burdens,
nor deprives any party of rights which they can claim to have had
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prior to establishment of Rule 4-501, this Court should hold
RockyMtn has not established any facts in this case.

CONCLUSION
So many unsupported claims and allegations have been made by
RockyMtn in this case that it has been difficult to focus this
brief.

And, as this appeal is from a summary judgment, every

allegation must be examined in order to foreclose RockyMtn from
claiming that it has raised an issue of fact and is thus entitled
to trial.
Nevertheless, Salt Lake County has painstakingly attempted
herein to show that RockyMtn has not one single fact before the
Court which would entitle it to a trial, whether or not Rule 4501(2)(b) is enforced against RockyMtn.
Simply stated, RockyMtn has not submitted before the Court, by
way of affidavit, deposition, answer, or admission, as required by
Rule 56(c) and (e) , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any facts to
support the allegations of its pleadings. Particularly, it has not
responded to Defts' refutation of those allegations. All RockyMtn
has done is claim that its allegations entitle it to a trial.
RockyMtn alleged negligence in the failure to "inspect and
maintain" the conduit.

The only failure claimed is a failure to

clean before the runoff.

Defts have denied, with admissible

evidence, that allegation.

RockyMtn has not overcome that denial

with any evidence whatsoever.
Additionally, Salt Lake County claims the benefit of the
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Governmental Immunity Act, Sec. 63-30-10 (1) and (4) , upon the
defense

that

the

maintenance

program

of

the

County

is

a

discretionary function and/or claims arising out a failure to
inspect are immune from suit.
Salt Lake County is also entitled to the defense allowed by
Sec. 63-30-10 (1) upon the premise that it is has no duty to
provide RockyMtn with protection from floods or flooding.

The

County's

the

program

is

based

upon

an

authorization

from

legislature to plan for, and construct, storm and flood water
drainage. The extent of that drainage, which necessarily includes
the type and amount of maintenance the County can afford, involves
discretionary decisions.

Giving RockyMtn the benefit of every

allegation in this case only shows a complaint that Defts didn't do
more for them.

RockyMtn cannot point to a single act or omission

of Defts which put it in danger of damage from a dangerous
condition created by Defts after the discretionary decisions were
made and effectuated.
RockyMtn then claims damage from a negligent failure to
immediately repair the conduit and North Temple.

Salt Lake County

has unequivocally countered that allegation with the affidavit of
the engineer retained to complete that work.

RockyMtn fails to

respond to that affidavit as required by Rule 56(e).
In short, Defts are entitled to summary judgment on the basis
of governmental immunity.
allegations as fact.

That is so, even accepting RockyMtn's

But in the main, RockyMtn has not countered

the refutations by Defts of each and every instance of negligence
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it has alleged.

It simply has no evidence to back up its claims.

Salt Lake County therefore requests this Court to sustain
Judge Murphy's reasoned order of summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 21st day of June, 1993.

KEVAN F. SMITH
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
Attorney for Defendant, Salt Lake
County
2001 South State Street, Suite S-3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, :
INC., dba HOPE OF AMERICA
THRIFT STORE, et al.,
:
Plaintiffs,

:

vs.

SUMMARY DECISION
AND ORDER
CIVIL NO.

C-83-6678

:

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah, et al.,
Defendants.

:
:
:

This matter comes before the Court on a series of motions:
defendants' motions for summary judgment; plaintiffs' motion to
amend the complaint; and defendant Salt Lake City's motion for
contempt.

Plaintiffs claim that the defendants' negligence in

managing the flood waters of 1983 and specifically the North
Temple storm drain caused

serious disruption

to plaintiffs'

businesses when North Temple had to be excavated.
Both of the remaining
City") and

Salt

defendants, Salt Lake City

Lake County

("the

summary judgment on numerous grounds.
these motions is wholly inadequate.

("the

County") have moved

for

Plaintiffs' responses to
Plaintiffs have failed to

^ ^ ^ ^
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adhere to there requirements of Rule 4-501(2) (b).

This failure

is significant in a complex case such as this where adherence
to the rule is a necessity
complex

theories, allegations

for the Court to sort through
and

factual

setting.

If the

Court in this Summary Decision has misapprehended or failed to
acknowledge any genuine issue of material fact, it is because
plaintiffs have not adhered to Rule 4-501 or otherwise submit
their theories and evidence in an understandable manner.
On

remand

from

the

Supreme

Court,

this

Court

should

determine whether the alleged negligence related to inspection
or to maintenance and operation, whether the alleged negligence
was the result of policy decisions or operational decisions,
and other defenses raised by defendants.

Rocky Mountain Thrift

Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459, 464 (1989).
In response to the defendants' claim that
genuine issue of material

there

is no

fact concerning their negligence,

plaintiffs suggest the following areas of negligence have some
evidentiary

support:

(1) failure to clean the storm

drain

prior to the flood; (2) the use of a dragline which in turn
allegedly precluded the use of augering equipment; (3) the use
of a 12 inch auger rather than a 48 inch auger; (4) the use of
blasting in the clogged drain; (5) the use of fire hoses; (6)

ROCKY MTN. THRIFT V. S.L. CITY
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of the inlet with a metal plate and allowing

debris to thereafter settle.
In support of their claim that genuine issues of material
fact exist concerning the six areas of alleged negligence,
plaintiffs refer to the deposition of Dr. Clark A. Lin and his
affidavit.

Never do plaintiffs refer to page numbers in the

Lin deposition nor do they reference a particular affidavit of
Lin.

The Court has gone the extra

entirety

of

the

Lin

deposition

step of
of

reviewing

April

22,

the

1991.

Additionally, the Court has reviewed the May 16, 1991 affidavit
of Lin which was attached to one of plaintiffs' responsive
memoranda.
support

of

In reviewing the materials submitted by the City in
its

motion,

the

Court

discovered

affidavit of Lin dated December 10, 1990.

an

earlier

Plaintiffs did not

direct the Court's attention to that particular affidavit.

If

there are any other affidavits of Lin, the Court is unaware and
no further specific affidavits have been referenced.
Construing

the

December

10,

1990

and

May

16,

1991

affidavits and the Lin deposition in a light most favorable to
plaintiffs, the

following

can be inferred:

defendants were

negligent in failing "to employ a program of maintenance and
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inspection to insure that the pipes are kept clean."
times

Lin

used

the

"maintenance11

terms

and

1

At

"inspection"

interchangeably, but it is clear that a regular "program" of
inspection would
maintenance.

be

either the precursor

to

or

a part of

As such, it is subject to either the applicable

statutory provision immunizing government conduct relating to
inspections or failures to inspect or is the result of a policy
decision

not to have

a regular program

for

inspection

maintenance and thus entitled to discretionary immunity.

and

Under

either scenario, defendants' claimed negligence due to failure
to inspect and maintain is within the legislated governmental
immunity.

See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake

City Corp., supra.
There is some testimony from him that the use of a dragline
was

not

flowing

good
from

engineering
this

to

practice.

which

Lin

The

only

testified

consequence

was

that

it

complicated augering, delayed augering for some indeterminant
period and reflected panic management.

Even assuming the use

of the dragline was negligent, there is no admissible evidence
that such use caused any damage.

1

December
10,
1990
affidavit,
paragraph
11.
Substantially the same statement is repeated in paragraph 12
and in the May 16, 1991 affidavit, paragraph 12.
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The Court can find no reference in the Lin affidavits or
the Lin deposition to the preference for a 48 inch auger over a
12 inch auger or to the use of fire hoses to clean debris.
Furthermore, while the December 10 affidavit suggests it is not
good

engineering

removal,

there

plaintiffs'

practice
is

damage.

no

to

utilize

evidence

of

Consequently,

blasting
how

for

debris

blasting

caused

defendants'

alleged

negligence due to the method of augering and use of fire hoses
and a causative link between blasting and plaintiffs' damage
have no evidentiary support.
The sole remaining factual issue submitted by plaintiffs
involves the allegation that the defendants were negligent in
interrupting the flow by capping the inlet pipe.
one reference to this in the testimony of Lin.
paragraph 14 of the May 16 affidavit.

There is but
This occurs in

There Lin suggests the

consequence of the capping was that the pipe thereafter became
plugged.

Throughout his deposition, however, he steadfastly

testified that the pipe became plugged before the flood.

(Lin

deposition, pp. 12, 13, 18, 22). Moreover, in the deposition
he testified that his claim of negligence related to pre-flood
conduct.

(Lin

deposition,

pp.

31-32).

The

affidavit

reference to the capping of the inlet pipe is at best oblique.
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Furthermore, there is no factual basis for the premise that the
pipe

became

plugged

after

the

flood

began

and

plaintiffs'

expert denies the premise.
The above analysis indicates that there is no genuine issue
of material fact concerning each of the alleged theories of
negligence.

Additionally, the Court is further persuaded that

plaintiffs have not demonstrated a duty owed to them sufficient
to overcome the showing necessitated by Feree v. State, 784
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989).

Such a showing is particularly necessary

in a case such as this where the claimed injury is not the
inundation of property but the loss of business revenues due to
the difficulties of consumer ingress and egress.
are therefore entitled to Summary Judgment.

Defendants

This determination

renders moot the City's request for sanctions and plaintiffs'
Motion to Amend Complaint.
The City's motion for contempt is denied.
of unprofessional

and unethical

Court's contempt powers.

The allegations

conduct are not within the

If counsel believes there has been a

breach of the governing rules of conduct, referral should be
made to the Utah State Bar.
Dated this r"

day of September, 1991,

IL

IICHAEL R. MURPHY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ROGER F. CUTLER #0791
Salt Lake City Attorney
BRUCE R. BAIRD #0176
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants
451 South State, Suite 505
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7788

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES,
INC., d/b/a HOPE OF AMERICA
THRIFT STORE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah, et al.,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF
SALT LAKE CITY AND
SALT LAKE COUNTY, AND
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Civil No. C83-6678
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendants.
The following identified motions came on regularly for
hearing and oral argument before the Honorable Judge, Michael R.
Murphy, on the 3rd day of June 1991 at the hour of 9:00 o'clock
a.m.; to-wit:

Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment and

Motion for Rule 37 Discovery Sanctions, dated on or about May 9,
1991; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated May
15, 1991; and Salt Lake City's Motion for Contempt, dated May 3,
1991.

Also pending before the Court was the plaintiffs' motion

to amend its complaint dated April 22, 1991, which motion was not
noticed by the plaintiff for hearing, but was included in the
City's Notice of Hearing and Notice of Oral Argument as an
optional matter for Court consideration.

The motion to amend was
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not orally argued on June 3, 1991 or requested to be so argued by
the plaintiff.
Salt Lake City was present through the appearance of its
counsel of record, Roger F. Cutler.

Salt Lake County was present

through representation of its attorney of record, Kevan F. Smith.
The plaintiffs were represented by their attorneys of record:
Wesley F. Sine and Marcus G. Theodore.
The Court having heard the oral arguments of counsel and
being fully advised in the premises took the matters under
advisement.

It independently reviewed the written memoranda

submitted by the respective counsel and, independently, reviewed
the matters of record as indicated in its memorandum decision.
Having been fully advised in the premises, the Court entered its
written Summary Decision and Order, dated September 4, 1991, and
based thereon
HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows:
1.

Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment should be

and the same is hereby granted; all of plaintiffs' claims against
said defendant are dismissed, with prejudice.
2.

Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment should be

and the same is hereby granted; all of plaintiffs' claims,
against Salt Lake County are dismissed with prejudice.
3.

Salt Lake City's Motions for Rule 37 Sanctions and

Contempt are denied.
4.

The plaintiffs' Motion to Amend its Complaint is denied.

5.

The defendants, Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, are
2
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awarded their costs, pursuant to law.
DATED this
this

day
day of
of /Qcl^b*.
A/f ZT^/^

/
jr ^

1991

BY THE COURT:
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MICHAEL R. MURPHY
Judge
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U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this

jtS^day of

1991, to the following:
Anne Swensen
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Kevan F. Smith
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, No. S-3600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Paul J. Toscono
Trustee Rancho Lanes
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kimball R. Mosier
Trustee Sine Investments
8 East 300 South, Suite 520
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Wesley F. Sine
349 South 200 East, Suite 170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

T^s^^XT^X^,\
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